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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
ISABELLE T. HARMSTON, DECEASED, 
By FARMERS & MERCHANTS BANK, a 
corporation, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
ROGER T. HARMSTON, Administrator of 
the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, Deceased, 
ROGER T. HARMSTON, FRED HARM-
STON, HELENE E. GILLIS and MARION 
EUGENE HARMSTON, as the Heirs at Law 
of Isabelle T. Hannston, Deceased, 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CASE 
NO. 8464 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF CASE 
While the same question that is presented on this ap-
peal was presented on the appeal of the consolidated cases 
of Harmston et al v. Labrum et al and Harmston v. Far-
mers & Merchants Bank, which is reported in 247 Pac. (2d) 
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895, such cases are in no sense the same as this case. 
Neither the pleadings nor the parties are the same. One 
of the reasons for the reversal of the judgment in the for-
mer cases was that the pleadings did not raise the issue 
of whether or not an oath of office had been taken by Roger 
T. Harmston in the estate of Isabelle T. Hlarmston, de-
ceased, and thereafter lost or destroyed. 
The appellants seem to take the position that the above 
mentioned opinion requires the respondent to proceed in 
the suits brought to vacate the judgments of foreclosure 
of mortgages involved in the former proceeding before this 
Court. As we understand appellants' position, it is that 
the court below erred in permitting the question of whether 
Roger T. Harmston had or had not taken an oath of office 
as administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston to 
be tried out in the probate proceedings of that estate. 
We do not find anything that was said or decided in 
the opinion rendered by this Court in the case above men-
tioned that supports such a claim. Indeed it is, to say the 
least, very doubtful if a valid determination of whether or 
not Roger T. Harmston had taken an oath of office as con-
tended by the Farmers and Merchants Bank could be had 
in the suit brought to vacate the mortgage foreclosure pro-
ceedings had by that bank. While a regularly appointed 
and qualified administrator has authority to represent the 
heirs at law of the decedent of whose estate he is the ad-
ministrator, the matter here contested is whether or not 
Roger T. Harmston was such administrator at the time 
he was served with Summons and at the time the fore-
closure of the mortgages were had. The heirs at law of 
Isabelle T. Harmston have an interest in the determination 
of whether or not Roger T. Harmston was the adrninistra-
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tor of theirc mother's estate at the time here involved, and 
as such are indispensable parties to such a controversy. 
39 Am. Jur. 852-54 and cases there cited. There is no basis 
for Roger T. Harmston to represent the other heirs at law 
of Isabelle T. Harmston in a controversy involving the ques-
tion of whether or not he, Roger T. Harmston, was admin-
istrator of such estate at the time involved in this contro-
versy. Moreover, •it seems obvious that if the record of 
the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston is to be corrected or re-
established, it must be in such estate and not in some other 
action. 
It will be seen that the former suit brought against the 
Farmers & Merchants Bank was so brought by Roger T. 
Harmston as administrator of the estate of Isabelle· T. 
Harmston, deceased. The other heirs of Mrs. Harmston 
were not parties to that suit and therefore would not be 
bound by a determination of whether or not Roger T. 
Harmston was the administrator of his mother's estate at 
the time here involved. We shall have more to say about 
this phase of the case in answer to what appellants have 
to say about the same. 
The appellants, in their brief, have cited an imposing 
array of cases and authorities, most of which, we believe, 
are foreign to the issues which this Court is called upon 
to determine on this appeal. In our view, the only ques-
tions which are before this Court for review are: 
1. Did the court below commit prejudicial error in 
determining the question of whether or not Roger T. Harm-
ston had taken an oath of office (as contended for by the 
respondent) by a proceeding had in the matter of the es-
tate of IsaJbelle T. Harmston, deceased, and if so, the sub-
stance of such oath? 
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2. Did the court below commit prejudicial error in 
the admission of evidence? 
3. Did the court below commit prejudicial error in 
excluding evidence? 
4. Does the evidence support the findings of the trial 
court? 
A brief summary of the evidence concerning which 
there is no conflict is as follows: 
There was received in evidence the files in two mort-
gage foreclosure proceedings wherein Farmers & Mer-
chants Bank appeared as plaintiff and Roger T. Harmston, 
as administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, ap-
peared as one of the defendants. Such cases were Civil 
1931 and 1932 (Tr. 30 to 34, both inclusive). Certified 
copies of the Findings, Conclusion and Decree in those cases 
have been brought up as a part of the record. We quote 
a portion of the Findings so made in this case: 
"1. That Isabelle T. Harmston died intestate on 
December 11, 1937 in Duchesne County, Utah. 
"2. That at the time of her death said Isabelle 
T. Harmston was a resident of Duchesne County, Utah 
and that she left as a part of her estate real property 
situated in Duchesne County, Utah. 
"3. That during her lifetime and on July 31, 1937, 
Isabelle T. Harmston made, executed and delivered to 
the petitioners herein, Farmers & Merchants Bank, 
her Promissory Note in the principal sum of $4500.00, 
which note was secured by a mortgage executed by 
said Isabelle T. Harmston on a part of the real prop-
erty belonging to said estate. 
"4. That during her lifetime and on October 19, 
1937 the said Isabelle T. Harmston executed and de-
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livered to the Farmers & Merchants Bank another 
promissory note in the sum of $2500.00, and also made, 
executed and delivered to the Farmers & Merchants 
Bank as security for the payment of such note, a mort-
gage for $2500.00 on a part of the real property be-
longing to said estate. 
"8. That on December 7, 1940 the Utah Savings 
& Trust Company was removed as administrator of 
the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased and Roger 
T. lfurmston was appointed administrator of said es-
tate to succeed the Utah Savings & Trust Company. 
The Order appointing Roger T. Harmston adminis-
trator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased, 
required that he take the Oath of Office and furnish 
·a bond in the sum of $1500.00 if a corporate bond. 
"9. That on March 8, 1941 Roger T. Harmston 
furnished and filed the required corporate bond in the 
sum of $1500.00, and that on or about March 8, 1941, 
Roger T. Harmston took his Oath of Office as admin-
istrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased, 
and that thereupon Letters of Administration were 
issued to him and that the said Roger T. Harmston 
now is and since March 8, 1941 has been the duly ap-
pointed, qualified and acting administrator of the es-
tate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased. 
"10. That the form of the Oath of Office so ta-
ken and the Letters of Administration so issued were 
substantially as by law required; that is to say, the 
Oath of Office was in substantially the following form: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT, PROBATE DIVISION, 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH 
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IN THIE MA 'ITER \ ~ 
OF THE ESTATE OF ( 
ISABELLE T. HARMSTON, ( 
Deceased } 
LEITERS OF 
ADMINISTRATION 
Roger T. Harmston is hereby appointed administrator 
of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT: 
Witness G. ARTHUR GOODRICH, CLERK 
of said Court with the seal thereof affixed 
this 8th day of March A. D. 1941. 
By G. ARTHUR GOODRICH, Clerk 
By Deputy Clerk 
STATE OF UTAH t 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE ~ ss. 
Before me, G. Arthur Goodrich, Clerk of the above 
district court, in and for !Duchesne County, on this 
8th day of March, A. D. 1941, personally appeared 
Roger T. Harmston, who being duly sworn for him-
self says that he will perform, according to law the 
duties of Administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. 
Hlarmston, deceased. 
ROGER T. HARMSTON 
Subscribed and sworn to before me 
the day and year aforesaid. 
Attest: G. Arthur Goodrich, Clerk 
______________________ Deputy. 
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"11. That the Oath of Office and Letters of Ad-
ministration above mentioned have been lost or de-
stroyed. 
"12. That on May 9, 1941, the petitioner herein 
filed its Complaint in this Court against Roger T. Harm-
ston as administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harm-
ston, deceased. In such action the petitioner sought 
a judgment against Roger T. Harmston as such admin-
istrator for the amount owing upon the above men-
tioned notes and to foreclose the mortgages given to se-
cure the same. 
"13. That on May 13, 1941, the Sheriff of Du-
chesne County, Utah personally served summons upon 
Roger T. Harmston, as administrator of the Estate of 
Isa:belle T. Harmston, deceased, such summons hav-
ing been served in Duchesne County, Utah." 
(283 to 286) 
The other evidence in the case came from four witnes-
ses called by the bank, such witnesses being Arthur Good-
rich, Arlene Smith, Edna L. Hartman and J. Rulon Mor-
gan. Merrill H. Larson was called as a witness by the bank, 
but upon objection by the appellants herein he was not per-
mitted to testify to any of the issues here involved. 
Arthur Goodrich testified that he was the Clerk of the 
District Court of Duchesne County, Utah, continuously from 
1934 to 1942 (Tr. 8). He identified a letter marked Ex-
hibit A as being a letter which he received and answered. 
The letter was offered in evidence and over objection of 
counsel for the appellants was received in evidence. The 
exhibit contained therein the following: 
"As to Isabelle T. Harmston, the Savings & Trust 
Company submitted their report as requested by the 
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an Order was signed by Judge Dallas H. Young dis-
charging them as Administrator. On March 8, 1941 
Roger T. Harmston filed his bond and oath of office 
and is now the acting and qualified administrator of 
the estate of Isa!belle T. Harmston." 
The letter was on the stationery of Duchesne County, 
and was signed by Mr. Goodrich. 
Mr. Goodrich further testified that at the time he wrote 
letters concerning the records in his office he always had 
before him such records, and that was the case when he 
wrote the letter about Mr. Harmston being the adminis-
trator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased. That 
he did not know what became of the oath. That at the 
time he served as clerk of the court he kept all the forms, 
including oaths of office; that when asked to recite the oath 
he said it stated: "I agree under the constitution to abide 
by all the laws, and I will execute my duty with fidelity-! 
don't remember." That the oath was the one usually em-
ployed (Tr. 13). That the oath was the regular Oath of 
Office (Tr. 14). That the best recollection of the witness 
was that the oath and bond were both brought in by Mer-
rill Larsen (Tr. 15). It will be noted that the bond was 
filed in the Isabelle T. Harmston estate on March 8, 1941. 
See Probate Files in Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, page 
235. 
On cross-e~amination Mr. Goodrich testified that he 
did not actually remember the Oath (Tr. 16); that he has 
no independent recollection who was the notary on the oath 
of office (Tr. 17). That he did not remember of any type-
written forms of oaths of office having been filed while he 
was clerk (Tr. 18). 
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Arlene Smith, a witness called by the bank, in sub-
stance testified: That she served as deputy clerk of the 
District Court of Duchesne County, Utah from November, 
1940, until November, 1942. That her duties were writing 
letters and filing and general office work. That she was 
serving under Mr. Goodrich. That it was always the prac-
tice of Mr. Goodrich to have before him the records con-
cerning which he wrote letters (Tr. 19). That she never 
remembered writing a letter for Mr. Goodrich concerning 
a record unless Mr. Goodrich had before him the record 
concerning which he wrote (Tr .. 20). On cross-examina-
tion she testified that she did not recall the correspondence 
with respect to the appointment of this man as adminis-
trator (Tr. 23-24). 
The testimony of Edna L. Hartman, who served as as-
sistant to Mr. Goodrich in 1935 up to 1938 and again in 1942, 
is substantially the same as that of Mrs. Smith as to the 
practice of Mr. Goodrich of having before him the record 
when he wrote letters concerning the same (Tr. 26-29). 
J. Rulon Morgan, a witness called by the petitioner, 
in substance testified as follows: That he is a lawyer re-
siding at Provo, Utah, and was a lawyer in 1941 (Tr. 34). 
That he represented the Farmers & Merchants Bank in the 
foreclosure proceedings in Civil Cases 1931 and 1932; that 
he appeared as a witness in those cases; that he made in-
quiry from Mr. Goodrich, the clerk of the court, and from 
Merrill Larson as to whether or not Roger T. Harmston 
had taken an oath of office in the Isabelle T. Harmston es-
tate prior to the time he took a judgment in the foreclosure 
proceedings in the two cases. He was shown Petitioner's 
Exhibit A and asked whether he had seen that before (Tr. 
35) . Over objection to the question on various grounds, 
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he was permitted to testify that he received the letter, Ex-
hibit A, through the mail and after receiving the same he 
went to Duchesne County for the purpose of securing de-
crees of foreclosure (Tr. 36). That before he offered evi-
dence in support of the foreclosure proceedings, he exam-
ined the records and files in the estate of Isabelle T. Harm-
ston, deceased, and that upon such examination he found 
a bond and an oath of office of Roger T. Harmston in the 
files of that estate. That as he recalled there were also 
Letters of Administration on the same paper as the oath of 
office (Tr. 37). That the oath of office was in the usual 
form, there was nothing unusual about it that attracted 
the attention of the witness. That at the time he testified 
in the foreclosure proceedings he had with him all of the 
files in the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased (Tr. 
38). Counsel for the appellant moved that the testimony 
of the witness be stricken because he was the attorney for 
both parties in the mortgage foreclosure proceeding. The 
motion was denied (Tr. 38-39). 
On cross-examination, Mr. Morgan was examined as 
to his connection with the estate of Marion Eugene Harm-
ston, deceased (Tr. 40). He testified that the interest that 
the estate of Marion Eugene Harmston may have had in 
the property foreclosed had vested in the Isabelle T. Harm-
ston estate at the time of the foreclosure. That the estate 
of Marion Eugene Harmston at most had only a nominal 
interest in the property that was foreclosed in the mort-
gage foreclosure proceedings in cases 1931 and 1932 where-
in the Farmers and Merchants Bank foreclosed the mort-
gages (Tr. 41-42). 
Merrill H. Larson was called as a witness by the pe-
titioner, and testified that he resides at Duchesne and that 
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, &. lw was the attorney for Mr. Hannston in the matter of the 
le~ estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased. That upon his 
gij~ being asked about whether or not he left with the clerk 
lc~ of this court an oath of office in that estate an objection 
was made by counsel for appellants on the ground that any 
i~: 
such testimony was privileged. The objection was sus-
tained (Tr. 47-48). Thereupon counsel for the petitioner 
stated that if permitted to do so he expected that Mr. Lar-
son would testify that according to his best recollection 
he saw an oath of office and bond of Roger T. Harmston 
that was filed with the clerk of this court when the bond 
was filed in March, 1941. No evidence was offered by the 
appellants. 
We have heretofore in this brief indicated the ques-
tions which we believe are presented for determination on 
this appeal, but instead of discussing the matters as out-
lined by us, it will probably make the questions which di-
vide us stand out more clearly if we follow the points as 
stated in appellants' brief. We shall follow that procedure. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRUL-
ING THE OBJECTIONS OF APPELLANTS WHEREBY 
THEY CONTENDED THAT THE QUESTION OF 
WHETHER OR NOT ROGER T. HARMSTON HAlD 
TAKEN AN OATH OF OFFICE IN THlE ESTATE OF 
ISABELLE T. HARMSTON MAY NOT PROPERLY BE 
HEARD AND DETERMINED IN THIS PROCEEDING. 
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POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED IN 
EVIDENCE PETITIONER'S EXIDBIT A, THE SAME 
BEING THE LETTER WRITIEN BY MR. GOODRICH 
STATING THAT "ON MARCH 8, 1941 ROGER T. HARM-
STON FILED HIS BOND AND OATH OF OFFICE AND 
IS NOW THE ACTING AND QUALIFIED ADMINIS-
TRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ISABELLE T. HARM-
STON. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED IN 
EVIDENCE THE FILES IN THE MORTGAGE FORE-
CLOSURE PROCEEDINGS, THE SAME BEING CIVIL 
NOS. 1931 AND 1932. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT DLD NOT ERR IN PERMITTING J. 
RULON MORGAN TO TESTIFY. 
POINT FIVE 
CROSS ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING OB-
JECTION TO THE TESTIMONY SOUGHT TO BE 
ELICITED FROM MERRILL H. LARSON. 
POINT SIX 
THE FINDINGS OF FACf ARE AMPLY SUPPOR-
TED BY THE EVIDENCE, THE FACI'S FOUND SUP-
PORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND THE JUDG-
MENT IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRUL-
ING THE OBJECTIONS OF APPELLANTS WHEREBY 
THEY CONTENDED THAT THE QUESTION OF 
WHETHER OR NOT ROGER T. HARMSTON HAD 
TAKEN AN OATH OF OFFICE IN THE ESTATE OF 
ISABELLE T. HARMSTON MAY NOT PROPERLY BE 
HEARD AND DETERMINED IN THIS PROCEEDING. 
On page 13 of appellants' brief there is cited some of 
the language used by the court in the case of Harmston, 
administrator vs. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 247 Pac. (2d) 
895 where it is said that "no motion had been made or pro-
ceedings brought to correct the records upon which appel-
lants were relying. By admitting evidence contradicting 
the record in the probate proceedings without a direct issue 
in the proceedings that the record was not correct, this 
court could not say the rights of the appellants were not 
substantially effected." 
Strictly speaking, the evidence, offered in the proceed-
ing which was the subject matter of review in the case of 
Harmston, administrator v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 
supra, did not conflict with the record in the probate pro-
ceedings in the Isabelle Harmston estate. What was there 
sought was to add to or re-establish a part of the record 
in the probate proceedings. If the oral testimony which 
respondent offered should be construed as contradicting 
the record in the probate proceedings, then and in that case 
such evidence would be inadmissible because of the elemen-
tary rule that oral evidence is not admissible to contradict 
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the written record. A number of cases cited by appellants 
in their brief support such doctrine and, of course, we have 
no quarrel with that principle of law. Before oral evidence 
is admissible to correct or add to the record, it must be 
made to appear either that the record is contrary to the 
truth or does not speak the whole truth. It was and is the 
petitioner's contention, as will be seen from its Petition, that 
the record in the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased, 
does not now speak the whole truth, in that the oath of 
office and letters of administration that existed in 1941 
have either been lost or destroyed. It would indeed seem 
to be a strange doctrine for this Court, or any other court, 
to hold that it is proper to correct or to add to a record in 
any given proceeding, by a proceeding had in some other 
matter. If that were done, the courts would be confronted 
with the dilemma of not knowing which of the two con-
flicting records is to be regarded as authentic and to be 
binding on the parties to any proceeding where their rights 
might be affected by what has been decided. In the nu-
merous cases cited by the appellants there is at least one 
case which holds that the records in a probate proceeding 
may properly be corrected by one interested in· the prop-
erty involved in such proceeding. Moore v. Braswell, 92 
So. 451, 207 Ala. 333. 
It will be seen that on pages 13 and 14 of appellants' 
brief cases are cited which they claim are authorities for 
the contention that the only way that the bank may prop-
erly proceed to litigate the question of whether Mr. Harm-
stan had or had not taken the oath of office is in the pro-
ceedings which have heretofore been reviewed by the court. 
We have carefully read the cases cited by appellants in sup-
port of such contention, but as we read them they fall far 
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short of supporting that which is claimed for them. As 
typical of the cases cited on pages 18 and 19 is that of Pie-
bus v. Dunford, 114 Ut. 292; 198 Pac. (2d) 973, where it 
is held that when a case is reversed the trial court shall 
proceed to dispose of such case as though it had not been 
decided, except when the Supreme Court has decided some 
issue the trial court may not decide such decided issue con-
trary to the way it has been decided by the Supreme CoUL"i:. 
This Court did not, in the Harmston v. Farmers Bank, sup-
ra, decide that the record of the Isabelle T. Harmston es-
tate should be tried out in the cases whereby the Harmstons 
seek to set aside the mortgage foreclosures. The authori-
ties, as we read them, are all to the effect that the proper 
way to correct or add to a record is to proceed directly in 
the matter where it is claimed the record is inaccurate or 
incomplete. 32 C.J.S. page 741, Sec. 809. It is there said: 
"In such cases the proper remedy is by legal pro-
ceedings to have the missing record properly made up, 
and for this purpose evidence is admissible to show 
the existence and occurrence of the proceedings, the 
record of which is to be supplied.'' 
The language just quoted is almost the same as the 
language used by this Court in the Harmston v. Farttiers 
& Merchants Bank case, supra. In support of the forego-
ing statement of law there is cited a number of cases. In 
each of the cases so cited, the proceeding to correct the 
record was had in the proceeding where the record was to 
be corrected or re-established. We have found no case to 
the contrary, and notwithstanding counsel for appellants 
has cited a great number of cases in his brief, none of such 
cases approve a proceeding where a record is corrected or 
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re-established in a case other than the one where the record 
is sought to be corrected or re-established. 
If a proceeding may be had to correct a record in some 
other proceeding, such a practice is certain to lead to con-
fusion. Different results may be reached in the different 
proceedings. The only parties bound by a given proceed-
ing are the parties thereto and those in privity with such 
parties. 30 Am. Jur. page 954, Sec. 222. All persons in-
terested in an estate are parties to the probate proceed-
ings of such estate, in that the probate of an estate is es-
sentially a proceeding in rem. 33 C.J.S. page 890, Sec. 12 
and cases cited in footnotes to the text. 
If the correction of the record is had in the proceed-
ing where the record is in error or incomplete, all persons 
who may be interested in having a record in a particular 
proceeding reflect the true state of what occurred therein, 
will naturally look to such record and not to some other 
record for the desired information, and when the informa-
tion is acquired its legal effect is to bind not only the par-
ties to such proceeding, but all who are in privity with such 
parties. 
In this case the proceedings had in the Isabelle T. 
Harmston estate is binding upon all persons who were in-
terested in such estate and all who are in privity with those 
who had an interest in that estate during the course of its 
being probated. 21 Am. Jur. page 377, Sec. 12 and cases 
cited in foot notes. 
On page 14 of appellants' brief, it is said that an issue 
was joined in the case of Harmston v. Farmers & Merchants 
Bank, supra, as to whether or not Roger T. Harmston had 
taken an oath of office in the Isabelle T. Harmston estate 
pl'ior to the time that proceedings were had to foreclose 
) 
I 
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the mortgages involved in the case of Harmston v. Farmers 
& Merchants Bank. Counsel is in error in making such 
statement. One of the grounds upon which this Court re-
versed the judgment in the case of Harmston v. Farmers 
& Merchants Bank, supra, was because there was no such 
issue raised by the pleadings in that case. 
On page 14 of appellants' brief it is also said that pub-
lic interest requires that there be an end to litigation. We 
quite agree with such statement, and the only safe way to 
put an end to litigation with respect to whether or not 
Roger T. Harmston did or did not take an oath of office, as 
claimed by the petitioners herein, is to have that question 
determined in the Isabelle T. Harmston estate. It is in 
that estate where it is claimed the record is incomplete. If 
and when the record is there completed, there will be an 
end to litigation upon that particular matter. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITIED IN 
EVIDENCE PETITIONER'S EXHIBIT A, THE SAME 
BEING THE LETTER WRITTEN BY MR. GOODRICH 
STATING THAT "ON MARCH 8, 1941 ROGER T. HARM-
STON FILED HIS BOND AND OATH OF OFFICE AND 
IS NOW THE AGriNG AND QUALIFIED ADMINIS-
TRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ISABELLE T. HARM-
STON. 
On pages 14, 15 and 16 of appellants' brief it seems 
they have some doubt as to whether or not there was at 
the time of the trial actually in existence and available an 
oath of office of Roger T. Harmston and letters of adminis-
tration in the Isabelle Harmston estate that had been taken 
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and issued in March, 1941. Of course, if appellants are to 
be understood as admitting the existence of such documents, 
that is the end of this controversy. 
It will be noted that in the petition filed herein, it is 
alleged in paragraph 11 (R. 241) "that the oath of office 
and letters of administration above mentioned have been 
lost or destroyed and that the only record of the oath hav-
ing been taken and letters of administration issued is the 
finding to that effect in the mortgage foreclosure proceed-
ing above mentioned." That allegation was denied in ap-
pellants' answer (R. 262). 
At the commencement of this trial, it was stipulated 
that in the files of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, de-
ceased, there was not in the files at the time of the trial 
either an oath of office or letters of administration of 
Roger T. Hlarmston prior to February 10, 1948 (Tr. 2 to 4). 
The files in the estate of Isabelle T .Harmston which were 
before the trial court at the t~me of the hearing of this mat-
ter, and are now before this Court, show such to be the fact. 
The fact that the oath of office and the letters of adminis-
tration were not to be found in the files, and that there was 
no record thereof prior to Feb. 10, 1948, would seem to be 
conclusive that such documents were lost or destroyed. If 
the same were in existence immediately before the trial, 
the presumption would prevail that the clerk would per-
form his duty and have the same placed in the riles and 
properly recorded. Moreover, the fact that Roger T. Harm-
ston took an oath of office and letters of administration 
were issued to him as of Feb. 10, 1948, clearly indicates that 
the original oath and letters were not to be found, other-
wise there was no occasion for Mr. Harmston to again take 
an oath of office and have letters of administration issue 
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1W to him (Tr. 238). It may be noted in this connection that 
!n~ 
11 the letters of administration issued to Roger T. Harmston 
on February 10, 1948, are not strictly in conformity with 
il) the form prescribed by the statute, in that the same does 
ffir~ not contain the words, "State of Utah, County of Duchesne," 
t~ nor do such letters contain the words, "of the District Court 
na·,. in and for the County of Duchesne." If the form prescribed 
~~ by the statute is to be strictly complied with, Mr. Harm-
~· ston is not administrator by reason of the letters issued to 
~~· him on February 10, 1948, but must rely on the letters is-
sued to him in March, 1941. U. C. A. 1953, 102-4-10, Vol. 
~~ 5, page 686. Probably more than enough has been said 
lao. 
oY. 
't 
ri~ 
ao: 
about this phase of the case, because this matter was tried 
by both sides on the theory that there was not in existence 
at the time of the trial either an oath of office taken or let-
ters of administration that were issued in March, 1941. 
Such was not only the theory upon which the present case 
was tried, but such was the theory upon which the case of 
Harmston v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, supra, was dis-
posed of, as fully appears from the opinion rendered in that 
case. 
On pages 16 and 17 of appellants' brief, cases are cited 
to the effect that secondary evidence may not be admitted 
in evidence if and when the primary or original evidence 
is available. Of course, we do not contend to the contrary. 
If, however, the best evidence is lost or destroyed, then sec-
ondary evidence is admissible. That is the holding of this 
Court in the case of Harms ton v. Farmers & Merchants 
Bank, and such is the law as stated generally by the authori-
ties, including a number of the cases cited by appellants. 
We are not entirely clear as to the basis for the argu-
ment touching the admission of the testimony of Mr. Good-
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rich and his two assistants. Of course, if there were a total 
lack of evidence that Mr. Harmston had taken an oath of 
office in March, 1941, there may be some merit to the con-
tention that the evidence of Mr. Goodrich and his assist-
ants was improperly received. That, however, is not this 
case as is amply made apparent by the testimony of Mr. 
Morgan and by the Findings of Fact by the court in the 
mortgage foreclosure proceedings. The fact that the tes-
timony of Mr. Goodrich and his assistants to the effect that 
Mr. Goodrich always had before him the records concern-
ing which he wrote, was offered and received before the 
direct and positive evidence that there was an oath of office 
and letters of administration in the Isabelle Harmston es-
tate in 1941 'Cannot possibly be said to have prejudiced the 
appellants. It is the uniform practice to permit counsel to 
offer their proof in such order as they may determine, and 
if evidence is offered and received in what may be said to 
be out of logical sequence, such fact does not form the basis 
of complaint because of the obvious reason that no preju-
dice can be founded upon such procedure. 
Moreover, the law is well established that in many in-
stances facts can be established only by circumstantial evi-
dence. 20 Am. Jur. pages 258-260, Sec. 270-272. So also 
is it the duty of one who is serving as a clerk of a district 
court to answer inquiries concerning matters pending in 
the court, and when he answered such inquiries the pre-
sumption prevails that the clerk does his duty. 
The case of Tree v. White, et al, 171 Pac. (2d) 398, 110 
Utah 233, cited by appellant on page 16, does not hold other-
wise. The fact that the oath of office taken and the let-
I ~ 
I, 
I ~ 
I 
) 
~ 
I 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
r: 
r.c 
21 
ters of administration issued in the Isabelle T. Harmston 
estate in 1941 were not to be found at the time of the trial 
may tend to weaken, but surely not destroy, the presump-
tion that the clerk failed to do his duty by truthfully stat-
ing that Roger T. Harmston had taken the oath of office 
and filed his bond prior to the time of the mortgage fore-
closure proceedings. To say that the letter, Exhibit A, did 
not tend to establish the claim of petitioner bank that Roger 
T. Harmston was the qualified administrator of the estate 
of Isabelle T. Harms ton at the time the letter was written 
would be to reject evidence of considerable probative value. 
Of course, Mr. Goodrich could not remember the language 
or the existence of each oath of office that was in the office 
of the clerk of the District Court of Duchesne County, Utah, 
during the years that he served in such office, but it would 
be rather strange for Mr. Goodrich to have written the let-
ter without having made some investigation as to the facts 
therein stated. 
The testimony of Mrs. Hartman and Mrs. Smith tends 
to establish a circumstance which corroborates the testi-
mony of Mr. Goodrich. Even though such testimony is 
not of great strength, as stated by ·counsel for appellants 
on page 20 of their brief, such fact would not justify its 
exclusion or constitute error because of its admission. Nor 
is the statement contained in the letter, Exhibit A, that Mr. 
Harmston had taken the oath of office and filed a bond in 
the Isabelle Harmston estate a conclusion. It is the state-
ment of a fact. How else could Mr. Goodrich make known 
that Harmston had qualified as administrator? 
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POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED IN 
EVIDENCE THE FILES IN THE MORTGAGE FORE-
CLOSURE PROCEEDINGS, THE SA:ME BEING CIVIL 
NOS. 1931 AND 1932. 
On pages 20 and 21 of appellants' brief attention is di-
rected to certain of the allegations of the petition filed by 
the petitioner bank herein, and it is argued that because 
some of the paragraphs were so stricken that therefore the 
court erred in admitting in evidence the files in those cases. 
The purpose of pleading the proceedings had in the two 
mortgage foreclosure proceedings was primarily to show 
that the petitioner bank had an interest in the Isabelle 
Harmston estate, and further to show that Roger T. Harm-
stan had known for nearly seven years that the bank 
claimed he was the administrator of his mother's estate 
as early as 1941, and that having been served with a sum· 
mons in that estate as the administrator and having made 
no claim to the contrary, he may not now be heard to say 
that he was not such administrator. 
A number of the allegations contained in the petition 
of the bank were probably not necessary to allege or prove 
in order to show that the bank had an interest in the prop-
erty foreclosed, because the same was a part of the estate 
of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased. It was for that reason 
that some of the allegations were stricken. As heretofore 
stated in this brief, the purpose of this proceeding was to 
establish the fact that Roger T. Harmston had taken an 
oath of office and letters of administration had been issued 
to him prior to the foreclosure of the mortgages. Even if 
nothing had been alleged with respect to the mortgage fore-
I. 
I. 
i. 
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closure proceedings, the files of such proceedings would 
have been proper evidence in so far as the same tended to 
show that Roger T. Harmston had taken an oath of office 
in his mother's estate and that he was the administrator 
thereof at the time of the foreclosure proceedings. It is, 
of course, elementary that one need not plead the evidence 
which one intends to offer in support of his cause. 
Moreover, it will be noted that paragraph 13 of the 
petition, wherein it is alleged that Roger T. Harmston was 
served with summons as the administrator of the estate of 
Isabelle T. Harmston by the Sheriff of Duchesne Cow1ty, 
Utah, was not stricken. Nor was the paragraph 15 of the 
petition stricken wherein it is alleged that a default judg-
ment was rendered in favor of the bank against Mr. Harm-
ston. 
The authorities teach: 
"* * * * default by a defendant operates as an ad-
mission of all matters alleged in plaintiff's pleading; 
more particularly a default has been held to constitute 
an admission of traversable allegations that are well 
and properly pleaded and are material to the issues or 
only such allegations as are necessary to obtain the 
particular relief sought. The rules as to admissions 
resulting from default have been said to obtain even 
though the allegations are untrue." 
49 C. J. S. page 358, Sec. 201 and cases cited in foot-
notes 
"A default has been held to admit the capacity in 
which plaintiff sues, that defendant is the person named 
in the writ and intended to be sued, that he occupies 
the position or status or fills the relation to others 
which is alleged in the declaration, and that the court 
has acquired jurisdiction of his person and of the cause 
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of action. It also admits the due execution and validity 
of the instrument sued on, that plaintiff's claim or de-
mand is just and legal, and that defendant has no de-
fense to the action." 
49 C. J. S. page 359, Sec. 201. 
Among the numerous cases cited in support of the text I ~· 
are two Utah cases, namely Hurd v. Ford, 276 Pac. 908; 74 
Utah 46; Utah Credit Men's Assoc. v. Bowman, 113 Pac. 63; 
38 Uta.h 326. In this last mentioned Utah case in 38 Utah I ): 
at page 335, in quoting from 23 Cyc 752, it is said that: 
"A default is an admission of every traversable 
allegation of the declaration or complaint necessary to 
plaintiff's cause of action that the defendant is the 
person named in the writ and intended to be served, and 
that the court has acquired jurisdiction of his person 
and has jurisdiction of the cause of action." 
In the case of Thorne v. McKinley Bros., 56 Pac. (2d) 
204, 5 Cal. (2d) 704, the Supreme Court of California says 
that a prior default carries with it the admission of all facts 
alleged in that action, and that admission may be applied 
against defendant in a new suit. An examination of the 
cases cited in the footnotes to the above quoted text are 
all to the same effect. So also the law announced and the 
cases cited in 31 Am. Jur., page 136, Sec. 525, which are 
to the same effect. 
In this case Roger T. Harmston not only failed to ap-
pear and deny that he was the administrator of the estate 
of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased, when he was personally 
served with a Summons by the Sheriff of Duchesne Coun-
ty, but he waited for a period of 6 years, 9 months and 11 
days after he was served with Summons in which he was 
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sued as the administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harm-
ston before he did anything by way of informing anyone 
that he was not such administrator. Even at this late date, 
he does not deny that he took the required oath of office 
in the estate of his mother or that letters of administration 
were issued to him. He contents himself with saying that 
you cannot prove such facts because the files of the estate 
do not so show. Courts of equity do not look with favor 
on such claims. People v. Swaim, 80 Cal. 199, 22 Pac. 66. 
In this case not only has Roger T. Harmston waited 
these many years before making any claim that he was not 
the administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston at 
the time he was served as such with a summons in the fore-
closure proceedings, but he is confronted with a judicial de-
termination that he was such, and unless the evidence of 
the other witnesses who were called to testify are to be dis-
believed, such determination finds support not only in Roger 
T. Harmston's constructive admission on account of his 
failure to testify, but also by the uncontradicted evidence 
of circumstance wholly inconsistent with any conclusion 
other than that such oath existed, and in addition thereto 
positive evidence that there were such an oath and letters 
of administration in the files of Isa:belle T. Harmston' s es-
tate when the mortgage foreclosure proceedings were had. 
At the former hearing of this matter we directed the 
attention of the Court to the case of Intermill v. Nash, 94 
Ut. 271, 75 Pac. (2d) 157, where it is held that: 
"A judgment upon its face, or the judgment roll 
upon inspection may show: First, that the Court had 
jurisdiction of the res and the parties; second, that the 
court did not have jurisdiction of the res or of the par-
ties; or third, the record may be silent on the question 
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of jurisdiction. In the first instance the record sup-
plies all the evidence; in the second instance, the rec-
ord itself shows the judgment void; and in the third 
situation the record imparting verity, jurisdiction in the 
court entering the judgment is presumed, since every 
court has the initial right and duty to pass upon its 
own jurisdiction." 
In the mortgage foreclosure proceedings, the evidence 
shows that Roger T. Harmston as administrator of the es-
tate of Isabelle T. Harmston was personally served with 
summons in Duchesne County by the Sheriff of that Coun-
ty. It thus clearly appears that the court had jurisdiction 
of Roger T. Harmston in the mortgage foreclosure proceed-
ings and there is nothing in the record in those cases which 
shows or tends to show that the court did not have juris-
diction of the res. Indeed, the court found that Roger T. 
Harmston was the administrator of the estate of Isabelle 
T. Hlarmston, which, if true, would give the court jurisdic-
tion of the res; that is the mortgaged property. 
Without belaboring this phase of the case at greater 
length, the record in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings 
contains the most reliable proof, if indeed not conclusive 
proof, that Roger T. Harmston was the administrator of 
the estate of his mother at the time of the mortgage fore-
closure proceedings. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMI'ITING J. 
RULON MORGAN TO TESTIFY. 
Appellant contends that little or no credence should 
be given the testimony of J. Rulon Morgan, because he at 
I, 
I : 
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one time represented the administrator of the estate of 
Marion Eugene fLarmston, the husband of Isabelle T. Harm-
ston. Mr. Morgan testified that the estate of Marion Eu-
gene Harmston was made a party as a mere nominal party; 
that the estate was without any interest in the property 
that was being foreclosed. 
Counsel is in error when he says thrut the estate of 
Marion Eugene Harmston was a co-maker of the notes and 
mortgages. No one who purported to represent the estate 
of Marion Eugene Harmston signed the note and mortgage 
for $2500.00, and so far as appears, Isa!belle T. Harmston 
never sought or was granted authority to sign the note and 
mortgage for $4500.00 as the administratrix of the estate 
of Marion Eugene Harmston. 
There is nothing which shows or tends to show that 
Mr. Morgan had any personal interest in either the estate 
of Marion Eugene Harmston or Isabelle T. Harmston. On 
the contrary, it is made to appear that Mr. Morgan was 
meticulously careful in seeing that everyone who had an 
interest in the property that was being foreclosed was made 
a party defendant. It would be attributing to Mr. Morgan 
extreme carelessness to reach the conclusion that he over-
looked a matter so vital to the mortgage foreclosure pro .. 
ceedings as to take a chance on Roger T. Harmston not in 
fact being the administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. 
Harmston, deceased. Not only was there the risk of hav-
ing a defective foreclosure, but also the likelihood that he 
may be charged with improper conduct in seeking to mis-
lead the Court into making a finding contrary to the fact. 
There is no conceivable reason why Mr. Morgan should 
seek to foreclose the mortgages on the property of the es-
tate of Isabelle T. Harmston without having before the 
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Court the administrator of that estate, and every reason 
why he should be certain that all parties who had or might 
have had an interest in the property being foreclosed were 
properly before the Court. On page 28 of appellants' brief 
some point is made about the T. being omitted from the 
name of Roger T. Harmston; and of an S being added to 
the word Roger. Obviously, such discrepancy is of no im-
portance. It is inconceivable that anyone other than the 
Roger T. Harmston who was sued as Roger T. Harmston, 
as administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Hnrmston, 
would take an oath of office in that estate or have letters 
of administration issued to him as such administrator. 
POINT FIVE 
CROSS ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING OB-
JECTION TO THE TESTIMONY SOUGHT TO BE 
ELICITED FROM MERRILL Hl. LARSON. 
The petitioner called Merrill H. Larson, who for a time 
was the attorney for Roger T. Harmston in the proceedings 
had in his mother's estate, whereby Roger T. Harmston 
sought to be and was appointed administrator of suches-
tate. The testimony sought to be elicited from him was 
whether or not he had seen an oath of office and letters 
of administration in the matter of the estate of Isabelle T. 
Harmston, deceased. Objection was made to such testi-
mony on the gr"9'und that any such testimony was privi-
leged because of the relation of attorney and client. The 
provision of the statute evidently relied upon is U. C. A. 
1953, 78-24-8, subdivision 2 thereof, which provides: 
I· 
! . 
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"(2) An Attorney cannot, without the consent of his 
client, be examined as to any communication made by 
the client to him or his advice given therein, in the 
course of professional employment." 
The testimony sought to be elicited from the witness 
Merrill was in no way concerning any communication made 
to or advice given Roger T. Harmston. 
In the case of Dineris v. Phelan, 62 Ut. 387; 219 Pac. 
114, it is held that an attorney is competent to testify with 
reference to contents of a lost deed which he prepared for 
a client, since such contents were not a part of a communi-
cation made to attorney by the client. For stronger res-
sons, an oath of offke taken in a probate proceeding and 
letters of administration issued in an estate is in no sense 
a communication made by a client. 
POINT SIX 
THE FINDINGS OF FAcr ARE AMPLY SUPPOR-
TED BY THE EVIDENCE, THE FACTS FOUND SUP-
PORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND THE JUDG-
MENT IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS. 
These facts are established by the evidence without 
conflict: 
1. The District Court of Duchesne County, Utah, ap-
pointed Roger T. Harmston administrator of the estate of 
Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased. 
2. On March 8, 1941, a surety bond was furnished by 
Roger T. Harmston, which bond was and is being used by 
Mr. Harmston as his bond as administrator of that estate. 
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3. l\1r. Morgan wrote to the Clerk of Duchesne Coun-
1 
1 
ty to ascertain if Mr. Harmston had qualified as adminis-
trator. In response to the letter the clerk informed Mr. 
Morgan that Roger T. Harmston had taken an oath of of-
fice in that estate and that he was the qualified and acting 
administrator of that estate. 
4. Mr. Goodrich testified that it was his practice to 
have before him the records concerning which he wrote let-
ters, and that while he did not recall this particular oath 
of office and letters of administration of Mr. Harmston, 
they were, so far as he recalled, in the usual form. 
5. Two of the assistants of Mr. Goodrich corrobo-
rated his testimony about his having before him the rec-
ords ·concerning which he wrote. 
6. Mr. Morgan testified that when the hearing on the 
mortgage foreclosure proceedings were had, he testified in 
such proceedings and that he had before him the oath of 
office and letters of administration of Roger T. Harmston 
in the estate of Isabelle T. HJarmston, deceased. 
7. In the mortgage foreclosure proceedings the Sher-
iff of Duchesne County served upon Roger T. Harmston, as 
administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, person-
ally, a summons. 
8. Roger T. Harmston failed to answer and a default 
judgment was taken because of such failure. 
9. In its Findings in the mortgage foreclosure pro-
ceedings the court found that Roger T. Harmston was the 
duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the 
estate of IsaJbelle T. Harmston, deceased. 
10. No claim was made by or on behalf of Roger T. 
Harmston that he was not the administrator of the estate 
of Isabelle T. Harmston until 6 years, 9 mos. and 11 days 
I. 
I 
I:: 
i: 
I· 
I. 
i' 
f 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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after the decree of foreclosure, notwithstanding during the 
greater part of that time the Farmers & Merchants Bank 
and its grantee had possession of the property upon which 
a foreclosure was had. 
11. Roger T. Harmston, being present throughout the 
trial, did not at the trial testify that he had not taken the 
oath of office and that letters of administration had issued 
to him as claimed by the petitioner. 
12. When it was sought to have Merrill H. Larson, his 
attorney, testify as to having seen the oath of office and 
letters of administration claimed by the Farmers & Mer-
chants Bank, counsel for Mr. Harmston interposed an ob-
jection which was without merit as to Roger T. Harmston 
and especially as to the other heirs of !~~belle T. Harm-
ston. 
As opposed to this array of evidence, the appellants ar-
gue that respondent's evidence failed to establish the par-
ticular language in the oath and letters of administration. 
Of course, it is ·unlikely that anyone could remember the 
language of a document that he saw nearly fourteen years 
ago. We doubt that either Mr. Harmston or his counsel 
can remember the exact language contained in the oath and 
letters that were issued in 1948 .. Nor is the exact language 
of the oath and letters of administration of controlling im-
poct:ance, because no rights are fixed by the language of an 
oath of office or letters of administration. Moreover, the 
evidence is that the oath of offke and letters of adminis-
tration were on the usual forms that were in use at that 
time. Compiled Laws of Utah 1943 that were in effect at 
the time here involved provides for what shall be contained 
in an oath of office and the form of letters of administra-
tion. U. C. A. 1943, 102-54-14 and 102-4-10. It is incon-
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ceivable that a spurious oath of office and letters of aQmin-
istration would be found in the matter of the estate of Isa-
belle T. Harmston or that if such had been the case neither 
Mr. Goodrich nor Mr. Morgan would have failed to observ~ 
such an unusual occurrence. 
If the evidence in this case does not esta!blish the fact 
that Roger T. Harmston had taken an oath of office and 
that letters of administration had issued to him in his moth-
er's estate, it is difficult to conceive of evidence that is suf-
ficient. 
Before concluding this brief, we wish to observe that 
we have carefully read all of the numerous cases cited in 
appellants' brief. To point out wherein such cases do not 
aid appellants herein would extend this brief beyond rea-
sonable Hmits. Suffice it to say that as we read such cases, 
none of them make against the contention of the respond-
ent. 
We submit that the decree appealed from should be 
affirmed with costs to respondent. 
ELIAS HANSEN 
J. RULON MORGAN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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